Joe Biden – The Observer view on how Joe Biden should deal with Vladimir Putin | Joe Biden
Revelations that hackers from the SVR, an elite Russian state intelligence agency, secretly penetrated the computer systems of the Pentagon and key US government departments puts Joe Biden in a bind. The president-elect must decide, perhaps sooner than he would have liked, how tough a line to take with Vladimir Putin’s rogue regime. This is not, after all, the first time Russia’s leader has directed covert cyber attacks at the US.
Russia denies secretary of state Mike Pompeo’s accusation that it ordered the hack, an exceptional security breach that also affected Britain and other US-allied countries. That denial is to be expected, but it’s not credible. Predictable, too, although nevertheless extraordinary, is the refusal of Donald Trump, who, notwithstanding a long post-election sulk, is still president, to make any comment or take any action against his Kremlin pal.
It thus falls to Biden, who has already effectively assumed leadership of America’s pandemic fightback, to figure out what to do about Putin after he takes office on 20 January. Speaking last week, he threatened to impose “substantial costs” on those responsible. “I will not stand idly by in the face of cyber-assaults on our nation,” Biden declared in a pointed rebuke to Trump.
That’s easy to say. Russia is already under tough US sanctions following Putin’s 2014 Crimea land grab. It has been expelled from the G7 and shunned by many European countries. Britain’s relations with Moscow have not recovered from the 2018 Salisbury poisonings. In Germany, pressure is again growing on Angela Merkel to cancel the Nord Stream 2 Baltic pipeline following the Kremlin’s abortive attempt to assassinate the Russian opposition leader, Alexei Navalny.
None of this seems to affect Putin’s behaviour. He appears contemptuous of democratic leaders; he smirkingly maintains western liberalism has failed. Having run rings around Trump, he may treat the experienced Biden more circumspectly. But he will not be more respectful, judging by last week’s insultingly tardy message of election congratulations. His offer to work together was more mail gauntlet than olive branch.
Biden and his Democratic allies must be tempted to take revenge for Russian digital meddling, social media manipulation and political collusion that many believe tipped the 2016 election against Hillary Clinton. But launching reciprocal covert operations to subvert Russia’s government, or hacking the Kremlin wifi, are not the best ways to further US and western interests.
The bottom line for Biden, much as he may resent the fact, is that his administration requires a working relationship with Russia if it is to have any chance of attaining some of its principal aims. The world needs Russian co-operation in tackling the climate crisis, meeting global challenges posed by the Covid-19 recovery and stabilising the Middle East, where Moscow, thanks to Trump’s neglect and incompetence, is now a more influential player, notably in Syria and Libya.
Most immediately, Biden requires Putin’s agreement to extend the 2011 US-Russia New Start strategic nuclear arms reduction treaty, which was undermined by Trump and which expires on 5 February. This must be the beginning of a concerted, joint effort to rebuild credible systems of nuclear arms control and nuclear non-proliferation. Part of this necessarily entails the US and Russia working together on the Iran and North Korea nuclear dossiers.
Despite these policy imperatives, Biden still can and should take targeted action against Putin’s Russia when its behaviour waxes egregious, as in the Navalny case. Now that the FSB team responsible for the murder plot has been identified, thanks to Bellingcat online sleuths, those involved should face justice in the US criminal courts, which are rarely shy about indicting foreign nationals. The same applies to those behind the hacking operation. Additional sanctions are another option.
This approach does not directly address the question of Putin’s personal responsibility, which appears significant in both instances. Yet Biden can raise the cost of his continued malevolence in other ways. Although he apparently does not think so, cocky Putin is vulnerable on several fronts. Russia’s oil-dependent economy is struggling; unchecked corruption is a huge issue; personal incomes are falling; and his popularity is falling with them. There are numerous, legitimate ways the west can assist Russia’s pro-democracy opposition in September’s parliamentary elections.
Putin’s obsession with reviving Soviet-era control of the “near abroad” is producing a serious backlash. In Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, anti-Moscow sentiment is strong. The recent Armenia-Azerbaijan war showed the limits of Russian influence. Putin’s forces are stuck in the Syrian quagmire. Despite Trump’s machinations, a united Nato straddles his western borders. He has few friends. In short, Putin’s regime is failing, isolated and unloved.
Biden’s best policy may thus be to bide his time, seeking Russia’s co-operation when necessary, while carefully picking his battles. Whether he gets this balance right matters a lot to Britain and Europe. What the president-elect and the western allies cannot afford is a simultaneous, two-front confrontation with both Russia and China. Putin is a pain and a problem. But China is the bigger and more pressing threat.
